9.

IMPARTIAL

REFLECTIONS

UPON THE

Present STATE of AFFAIRS.

In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

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UPON THE

Preſent STATE of AFFAIRS.

WITH

INCIDENTAL REMARKS

UPON

Certain Recent TRANSACTIONS.

In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

Read Pamphlets with Suſpicion; neglect all Declamation; weigh the Reaſoning; and advert to Facts.

BOLINGBROKE.

DUBLIN:

Printed for H. SAUNDERS, in *Caſtle-ſtreet*, R. WATTS in *Skinner-row*, and S. SMITH, at Mr. FAULKNER's in *Eſſex-Street*. MDCCLXI.

BRITISH MUSEUM

IMPARTIAL REFLECTIONS, &c.

IT is, Sir, to your candor that I ſubmit the following juſtification of the opinion of numbers beſides myſelf, upon the public affairs; a juſtification which is, in ſome meaſure, extorted, by the appellation of fool or knave, ſo politely beſtowed on all who preſume to refuſe their admiration to the great man, or to his political conduct, to his invincible conſtancy, and even to his profound diſintereſtedneſs. All I intreat of you, if you deign to afford the following ſheets a peruſal, is a ſuſpenſion of prejudice; impartiality is what a reader owes, at leaſt, to himſelf, as much as a writer owes it to both the reader and himſelf. That vulgar paſſion of a pre-determination againſt a juſt conviction, is not ſurely the characteriſtic of a lover of reaſon and truth: and ſuch I take it for granted you are, or the addreſſing my ſentiments to you would be labour knowingly loſt. At the ſame time I am ſo far from deprecating your ſcorn and indignation, ſhould you have juſt cauſe to think that I am deſignedly employing thoſe ſacred names of reaſon and truth for covers to ſophiſtry and falſehood, that in that caſe I beſpeak their falling on me with redoubled weight.

And now, without farther preface, allow me to

lead you back to that celebrated, or, to expreſs myſelf with more propriety, to that infamous epoch, when it was impoſſible to deſpiſe more than it deſerved, the imbecillity of a miniſtry, and the conſequent damage and diſhonour to the nation, from the faint, inadequate manner, in which our war was conducted: when, to point out the uttermoſt bathos into which we were ſunk, it may ſuffice to obſerve, that an iſland, I repeat it, an iſland, belonging to us a maritime power, indiſputably ſuperior in naval ſtrength as well as in many others to our enemy, was ſhamefully loſt, after ſuch a precedent manifeſtation of preparatives and menaces from that enemy, as aggravated, beyond meaſure, the infamy of our loſs.

It was then, no wonder, that the nation alarmed in good earneſt, at ſo ſhocking an event, ſhould look out for ſome defenders of its deſerted or betrayed intereſt. In this impatience, it was natural, though perhaps not quite ſo wiſe, to take the readieſt.

There was then a man who had once before made a figure in the oppoſition to court meaſures, which oppoſition he had quitted for that valuable conſideration, called a poſt, and quitted it with ſuch a quickneſs of turn and converſion, as not to keep the meaſures of common decency either with the public, or with himſelf, after which he for a number of years ran as tame and mute along with the miniſterial pack, as the moſt thoroughly broke of them all, however *ſtrange* he might always look upon them. Upon this occaſion however of the national diſtreſs, nothing could be eaſier than to foreſee that the actual management of things could not long hold out againſt the clamours of a people rouſed, exaſperated, and never famous for their tame endurance of palpable miſmanagement.

ment. Neither did it require any very deep reach of policy to imagine that a ſhow of concern for the public good, might advance a private intereſt, by the acquiſition of popularity.

As to any objection to a perſon re-aſſuming the part of a patriot, after having before deſerted it, you will ſee by the ſubjoined note * that it has been long

* " Whoever is but qualified with *impudence* enough to back " his *ignorance*, and enable him to become a SMALL *orator*, he " preſently expects his *retaining fee*, and *till* he has received it, " is *implacable*. As ſoon as he *has* it, like a *regenerate* man, his " eyes are *opened* preſently, and he puts off the *old man*, and has " NEW *thoughts*, and *opinions* and *judgments*, as if he had lived *be-* " *fore* in *error* and *darkneſs* all his life-time. Of theſe there are " not more at a time than a dozen or twenty at moſt, who *govern* " all the reſt of the houſe by *combining* together and *ſeconding* " one another, and *ſtudying* every man his PART. By which " *arts* they can eaſily prevail upon the greater number of the " houſe, who only came as *ſpectators*, not to *act* but *look on*, and " cry up or down all that they ſee *others* do, whom they have " choſen for their *proxies*. And as theſe *grandees* as they call " them, are *taken off* with *bribes* or *preferment*, others *ſtart up* " in their room, and keep the party on foot, who, if there was " nothing to be *got* by it, would give it over themſelves. But " when this kind of *juggling* is rendered the *readieſt* way to ad- " vancement, and that nothing is more common than to ſee " thoſe who have *done their exerciſes beſt* in thoſe *liberal arts* in " the houſe of commons, to be always promoted to the houſe of " lords, there will never want *proficients*, and thoſe of the *worſt* " *men*; while princes *reward thoſe beſt who ſerve them worſt*, " and truſt none with the greateſt charges of the nation, but " only ſuch as have *forced* their way by oppoſing the intereſt † " of king and people, that can give no ſecurity for their *faith* " and *integrity*, but the PERFIDIOUSNESS of thoſe courſes " which they took before to put themſelves into a capacity of " preferment. And this indeed has for ſome years been reputed " the TEST of mens *parts* and abilities, by which they only " can *deſerve* to be either *truſted* or employed; as if TREACH- " ERY was like the SMALL-POX, which every man is to expect " one time or other, and thoſe who have had it are FREE for ever " after." BUTLER'S *Remains*.

N. B. † How much more foul is the caſe where the oppoſition by which a man *forces* his way into power, and deſerts that op- poſition afterwards, has been not to the intereſt of king and country, but in favour of it?

long a ſettled point in this country, that a patriot is entitled to the privilege of a Turkiſh *ſanton* or *derviſch*, who, when arrived to a certain degree of perfection, can no longer *ſin:* nay, the moſt flagrant enormities are imputed to him as righteouſneſs. And indeed, it has been evidently proved that modern patriotiſm has in this the advantage of thoſe ſtale tricks of pricking in the belt or guinea-dropping, that whereas theſe will ſtill hardly paſs twice on the verieſt country-boobies that have been once taken in by them, and eſpecially if practiſed by the ſame ſharper, there are numbers that the oftener they have been bit by a mock-patriot, ſeem but the keener for being bubbled again, by him.

The *great man* then who, to do him but juſtice, appears to have taken pretty right meaſure of the "*credulity*" of thoſe he had to deal with, once more ſtood forth, and once more donning the patriot buſkins, rent the roof with rants againſt the ruinous tendency to both king and country, of ſuch meaſures as linked us too cloſely to the continent, or could occaſion the ſacrifice of Britiſh treaſure and blood to foreign intereſts.

This was a ſubject upon which there could be no hyperbole, no oratorial exaggeration. The moſt bold figures of ſpeech were even beneath reality. That this ſpeech-maker then could perſuade others of ſo ſelf-evident a truth, as that of the deſtructiveneſs of continental meaſures, is not the wonder. The wonder is that any Briton, in a point of ſuch intuitive clearneſs, ſhould need any perſuaſion at all. But the much greater wonder yet was that the very individual identical man, who, in the memory of numbers preſent, had but a few years before with all the powers of a kind of bowwow eloquence barked himſelf into a place, by railing againſt continental connexions, ſhould not only be liſtened

liſtened to with common patience, ſhould not only procure admirers and adherents, but even outbrazen his collegues of that old faction or leaven, who, had they had nothing to reproach to him, but his ever having accepted a conſideration for joining them at all, would have had enough to have ſilenced one of a leſs unembarraſſed countenance.

The noiſe however that he made within doors ſoon got without, and had even a greater effect than his moſt ſanguine wiſhes ought to have preſumed. It was enough for the good people of Britain that there was at length one man ſtanding forth, with power of face and lungs, to ſtem that torrent of corruption, through which all the Britiſh intereſt and even honour were actually ſacrificed to a foreign avarice, ſo amazingly blind, as not to ſee that the money of which we were robbing ourſelves to glut it, could only purchaſe its own deſtruction as well as ours. In a tranſport ſhow of joy and gratitude the people did not ſtand to examine ſcrupulouſly from what quarter this puff of fair wind came, but hailed it with all the acclamations of zeal and genuine patriotiſm. We ſhall ſoon ſee this popularity openly carried to the old market, and the man who without it, could not have been worth half-a-crown to his purchaſers, traffic for a place, and ſell both himſelf and the credulous people who had truſted him for other ends and more virtuous purpoſes, in a manner that added one inſtance more to the numbers with which hiſtory abounds, of the power of little things to produce great events.

But firſt let us review the procedure of the old faction. The whole year of 1757 had elapſed in the moſt ſcandalous inactivity. None of the court undertakers with all their moſt ready and ſervile willingneſs to comply with the reigning humour

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of the court for involving the nation in the embroils of the continent, on any pretence that might but bring or keep the Hanoverians and Heſſians on our pay-book, had ſo much as dared to think of ſending our troops to Germany, deterred eſpecially by the clamour for which they imagined ſuch a ſtep would give a handle to the real or pretended patriots. The dilemma was embarraſſing: they could not well keep their footing at court, without carrying that main-point of having the Germans accepted for ſtipendiaries, a point to which thoſe points of exporting our own troops, and of involving us in a quarrel in which we had nothing to do, with the beſt part of Europe, as well as with our beſt friends, were but ſubordinate and ſacrificed conſiderations: and, at the ſame time, they deſervedly ſtood ſo low in the opinion of the people, that they could not take upon themſelves a ſtep ſo thoroughly diſguſtful to the nation, as that of plunging it into a continental war, eſpecially where the part we were to take in it muſt be in favour of a natural friend to France, againſt a natural enemy to France, however a momentary occaſion might have changed the permanent ſyſtem of thoſe courts, in reſpect to each other, and change it perhaps, greatly, through our own fault and impolicy.

In this aukward ſituation were the members of that bleſſed old faction, which in virtue of its powers to corrupt and of its devotedneſs to the court, in one unnational point, upon the modeſt condition of their governing in all the reſt, had long maintained the glorious prerogative of awing their maſter, and ruining their own country. But out of this maze, in which their own total want of all genuine ſound politics, had bewildered them, the glory of delivering them, was reſerved for a hardy adventurer in a cap-a-pee brazen armour,

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and who owed all his powers to ſerve them, to the people's opinion that he deſpiſed them as heartily, as all his ſpeeches ſince his laſt burſting out againſt the court, would have led any that did not know him to believe.

But with all that imbecillity which he had perhaps not wrongfully attributed to the court-party, of that time, the event ſhewed that they knew admirably well how to make him their tool. But for them not to plume themſelves too much on this piece of management; they need only conſider two points; *the firſt*, that the ſteps to which they wanted the ſanction of his popularity, were ſovereignly deſtructive of the good of their country, which was, in them, the greater madneſs, for that ſome of them had a large ſtake in it; the *ſecond*, that their plan of employing ſuch a tool is not abſolutely a new one, as the ſubjoined note will ſhow, on the ſubject of princes having unnational points to carry *.

This untriumphable point then they carried: and as, for their own ends and ſpecial purpoſes, that perſon could hardly have too much popularity, while he ſhould continue to do that work they

" * Finding that other men of *fortune* and *figure* would rather " *obſtruct* than *promote* their intentions, they thought it more " conducive to their ends, to be ſerved by another ſort of peo- " ple, and did therefore bring into the management of their " affairs all along, a ſet of miniſters, *weak, ambitious, light, de-* " *ſigning, raſh, unſkilful in the arts of* WISE *adminiſtration, and* " *verſed in nothing* but *craft and tricks*; but at the head of theſe " they had always ſome one that was to be the FORLORN HOPE " and who would venture to go GREATER LENGTHS than any, " of his *companions*. And for this *poſt*, they generally choſe a " PUSHING MAN, of a bold ſpirit, a ready wit, a *fluent tongue*, " obſcure, and low in the world, and ſuch an one whom for- " tune could hardly leave in a worſe condition than ſhe found " him."

DAV. *On Private Men's Duty in the Adminiſtration of Public Affairs.*

wanted him to do, and which they had neither ſpirit nor influence enough to dare to take upon themſelves, it was no wonder that all their little creatures of power ſhould take the cue from their patrons, and join to fill up that public cry, by which the virtues of the great patriot were ſo loudly extolled.

One would however naturally enough have imagined that a man with any head at all, muſt have miſtruſted, at leaſt, *their* applauſe, conſidering the quarter from which it came. He might have juſtly doubted of his being in the right way, if for no other reaſon, than his being approved by them; approved by thoſe whom he had either greatly wronged by railing at and affecting to deſpiſe them; or they muſt have undergone an inſtantaneous change or regeneration, for him to ſet any great value on their approbation, and eſpecially for him to adopt thoſe meaſures which himſelf had treated as crimes in them, but were now miraculouſly to become acts of virtue and patriotiſm in him. And this is what the poor deluded people applauded under the ſpecious name of UNANIMITY! Alas! little did they conſider, that where one's enemies are at variance, there may be ſome hope; but that their *unanimity* muſt be an increaſe of danger. And in what had certain perſonages ever given proofs of their having ceaſed to be, what the people had always thought them, at leaſt in their politicks and conduct, the enemies of this country? Or could he be the friend of it who joining them, went ſo far beyond them in the purſuit of thoſe very meaſures, which even they durſt not attempt; while their diſpoſition to attempt them, was what he had ſpecifically declaimed againſt in them, as an unconteſtable mark of their enmity to this country?

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To thoſe however to whom this great man could hardly be a problem, after their having conſidered his firſt deſertion on the acceptance of a place, with ſuch a ſuddenneſs and ſcorn of keeping meaſures with common decency and common policy, as every one may remember, it could be little or no ſurprize to ſee him give the public a ſecond proof of what he was capable of. And to ſay but the truth, the public deſerved it: the firſt deception of their confidence was undoubtedly his fault, but the ſecond theirs: excuſable however in this, that no one elſe preſenting themſelves to the ſervice of their country, they thought him perhaps better than none: perhaps too they imagined that it was not poſſible for a human creature to repay ſo unmerited a confidence with another deſertion.

To whom is it unknown, how, after his acceptance of his poſt he behaved, in conſequence of that his deteſtation of continental connections to which he ſo palpably owed all his popularity and conſequence? A popularity and conſequence that did not however fail him, even after he had juſtly forfeited them, but were continued to him on account of certain events during his adminiſtration, which had a falſe air of *ſucceſſes*, and were aſcribed to him, who had little or more hand in them than the not having hindered them, and whoſe fault it will perhaps be found, when too late, that they were not *ſucceſſes* indeed; whereas reſting as they now do, upon ſo falſe a bottom, as that of our double war, they are only proofs of the excellence of a naval ſyſtem of operations: while even our victories on the continent could produce us nothing, but the prolongation of a ruinous war upon it, without the poſſible obtainment of one valuable end, or even of honour by courage ſo miſerably thrown away on the execution of the plans of ig-

norance and falſe policy, in the abettorſhip of a cauſe branded by public judicial decrees, with the odious appellations of contumacy and rebellion.

Alas! from that fatal epoch, in which there appears no reaſon on earth for our going ſuch lengths in eſpouſing the Pruſſian cauſe, except its ſerving for a pretext to get the German troops once more reinſtated ſtipendiaries to us under the more dignified name of allies, we might have miſcarriages, we might have unfavourable accidents, but nothing could, properly ſpeaking, give us *ſucceſſes*. The inoculating us on that diſeaſed branch of a continental quarrel, could at the beſt produce a vain ſhew of bloſſoms, but never fruit. What we call *ſucceſſes* are, not improbably, worſe than actual diſadvantages, which might perhaps have let us ſee that precipice of which thoſe ſucceſſes were but the flowers that covered the brink from our ſight.

A mock-ſtateſman as incapable as the loweſt of the populace, of farther views than the parade or flaſh of the moment, might indeed, in his falſe eſtimate of things, think he was giving wondrous proof of his abilities, in planning expeditions, the meaſures for ſome of which were taken ſo ſhort, that nothing but ſuper-human Britiſh valour could have ſupplemented the blundering deficiency, and others were as infallible as they were obvious, from their being in our natural naval channel. But to thoſe who looked a little deeper than the mere ſurface of things, even thoſe ſucceſſes wore and ſtill wear a deplorable cadaverous aſpect, from the rotten bottom given to them, by that fatal connection of the continent, which muſt ultimately decide of the ſum of things, decide whether after being the bubbles of thoſe ſucceſſes we may not be the victims of them. And in the mean while has not that oſtentation of them with which ſome people are ſo dazzled, ſomething of the air of what is

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called chambermaid's play, at whiſt, when ſome novice-player hurries out at firſt three or four winning-cards, with great exultation, ignorant of the art of huſbanding his game, and unaware of the ſuperiority in the adverſary's hand, that beſides the honours is ſure to give him the odd trick?

Who does not know that often in the courſe of a war between nations, the final victory is by no means the conſequence of intermediate ones; and that ſucceſſes of the ſecond rank are ſo far from ſecuring thoſe of the firſt, that they are often the very cauſes of their not being obtained? Where the true principles of policy have been deſerted or ſacrificed: where the iſſue of an undoubtedly fair national cauſe has been ſhifted from its own foundation, and made to reſt upon a foreign one, at beſt dubious as to right, and certainly an impolitic one in the higheſt degree, what have we better to expect, but that we ſhall pay dearer yet than we have done for that perfidious glare of our moſt hollow ſucceſſes? Can we poſſibly doubt it, unleſs we ſhould be mad enough to imagine that it is fit and reaſonable that the ſyſtem of Europe ſhould adjuſt itſelf to our humours, paſſions, and convenience, the very thought of which every true Briton, one ſhould think, would rather deteſt and diſown, as being ſo contrary to that ſpirit of liberty of commerce, and of humanity, which makes this nation the univerſal friend to mankind, and eſpecially the moſt intereſted in the general pacification and welfare of Europe?

In what execration then ſhould we not hold the propagation of ſuch lies as thoſe with which the Britiſh public has been ſo often attempted to be tricked and amuſed; while the ſuppoſition that ſuch inventions could be agreeable to it, is not but the higheſt inſult at once to their underſtandings and humanity? How often have not motions

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and preparations of war been falſely attributed to the kings of Denmark and Sardinia ?——Then again the Turks are breaking into the Ukrain : ——the Czarina is dying or dead : with other fictions of this ſtamp ; as if Britain had no hopes or reſources but in the death of potentates, or in new ſcenes of blood, confuſion, or rebellion being opened in every part of the globe. And theſe ſentiments ſo hoſtile to univerſal ſociety, are imputed not only to a commercial nation, but to the moſt humane nation in the world !

In the mean while, it has been ſaid that the neutral nations beheld the mighty change operated in this country by the great man's acceptance of power, with " *amazement* and *veneration.*"

As to " amazement," there can be no doubt of our having ſubſcribed full ſufficient cauſe for it. Unfortunately for Britain, there exiſted a prince ſo evidently in the career of perdition, that not only his greateſt well-wiſhers, ſubjects, and relations, lamented his obſtinacy in embarking in it, but even his *ſucceſſes*, for he too had his *ſucceſſes*, at firſt, were but the more aſſured pledges, if not of his deſtruction, at leaſt of the utmoſt danger of it : while his procedure was ſuch as would make the faireſt cauſe a foul one, ſince it was publickly *deteſted* by our late ſovereign, who did not the leſs join him ; and it was with this very prince, that the great champion of anti-continentaliſm, was pleaſed not only to draw our ties cloſer than they already unhappily were ; but in the manner by which the Hanoverians and Heſſians were encouraged by their re-admiſſion into our pay, (only think of who made, who countenanced this motion !) left it problematical to all Europe, on which ſide it was that a moſt ſacred convention was broke. And how broke ! to the diſhonour of a prince of our nation who had been expoſed to a ſuperior French army,

army, without any aſſiſtance from hence, merely for fear of the loud clamours of the very man, who afterwards, when the juncture for ſending troops was incomparably more forbidding, could ſet his face to the ſending near thirty thouſand of the flower of our army, after having in expreſs terms declared, that with his conſent not a ſingle man ſhould ever ſtir upon that errand. But it ſeems, that, more ductile at that time, he rather choſe to reſign himſelf than to reſign his poſt. Or rather was not that reſignation of himſelf the wretched bargain of his poſt? Thus our forces, which it was certainly always eligible not to export to Germany, were with-held, when there was at leaſt a reaſon of dignity for letting them go, and a chance for their doing ſome good; whereas they were, through the inconſtancy of our excellent patriot, ſent when it was impoſſible for them to be of ſervice either to ourſelves or to our allies, or indeed to do any thing but miſchief to both.

The inconſiſtence then of our politics with our intereſt might well excite the amazement of neutral nations: but it is harder to account for its not exciting our own. But may that amazement not come too late! when Britain reſtored to her ſenſes can hardly fail of ſeeing that her treaſures have been ſquandered away, and her blood not even over-honourably flowing, not only in a cauſe not her own, but while ſhe had a moſt fair and juſt one of her own depending, of which the iſſue was hardly doubtful, if ſhe would but have been true to herſelf.

As to the "*veneration*" of neutral nations, I likewiſe grant that, if by veneration is meant their keeping their diſtance, and not chuſing to have any thing to do with us; to ſuch a point, that they would hardly dare to take our money, as fond as they are of it, to connect with us, even

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if the bottomleſs pit of Germany had left us a ſixpence to ſpare to them. There is ſcarcely I preſume to be found among the neutral powers another Pruſſia, for us to ruin, by ſuch another injudicious alliance.

And indeed the encouragement this nation has been unhappily betrayed to give to that potentate, has been ſo much againſt the intereſt of Pruſſia, that conſidering him in the light of the natural friend to France, from his enmity to the houſe of Auſtria, perhaps the moſt antigallican ſtep in the whole war is our having, undoubtedly without deſigning it, contributed to the danger, and, may it not be to the deſtruction of that prince. A prince whoſe fall or reduction either France will moſt probably have reaſon to rue; or our politics will have been the occaſion of connecting her ſo indiſſolubly with Auſtria, that the reſt of Europe will not have a little to reproach us for the higheſt danger to its liberties from that union: and this is indeed what the neutral powers cannot too much conſider, nor be too jealous of it.

In the mean while only conſider with yourſelf what muſt be the ſentiments of France, allowing France to have but common ſenſe, of the part we have taken in the tragedy now acting on the German theatre, for her benefit, let the cataſtrophe be what it will.

If Pruſſia ſhould happily not be cruſhed, we ſhall have, at an immenſe expence, and in conſequence of our having diſguſted or turned hoſtile to us ſo many friendly powers, have preſerved one, who never cared a pinch of ſnuff for us, before he thought he wanted us; and whoſe permanent natural intereſt is, for a thouſand obvious reaſons, to be the faſt friend of France, to whom to be ſure he would not ſacrifice us, if a fair occaſion, or the exigency of his affairs required it.

If on the other hand Pruſſia ſhould happen to be cruſhed or reduced ſo low as to be no longer of any weight in the balance againſt Auſtria, then France cannot fail of aſſuming to herſelf, with ſome colour of reaſon, ſome merit for having, at leaſt, made a ſhow of co operating to his reduction, and for a proof produce thoſe her loſſes, which we are now ſo loudly boaſting of as ſucceſſes; though they will afford France ſo fine a handle of claim, not improbably to the Auſtrian Netherlands, as well as to other conſiderable territories of which ſhe is already in poſſeſſion, more than equivalent to all that ſhe has loſt to us, and which will be ſuch an acceſſion of ſtrength to her, as may ſoon enable her either to recover what ſhe has loſt, or to make the holding of our conqueſts a very bad bargain to us, at the expence of a perpetual war not with her alone, for that might not be much, nor even with Spain joined to her, but with the whole continent, or at leaſt with the greateſt part of it, which may not improbably be armed againſt us, in conſequence of our eſpouſal of the Pruſſian cauſe, and of our bleſſed continental engagements, where we are now holding the wolf by the ear; ſince we can neither well quit nor well adhere to them. A ſyſtem of politics this for which Britain may with as much propriety thank the *ſine qua non* promoter or father of it, as France either exult at his going out of office, or mourn in ſackloth and aſhes his return into it. A return at which, as things go, no one would have any right to be ſurpriſed, or indeed at any thing, unleſs the prevalence of reaſon, or of the true intereſt of this nation.

But as to France, I defy her with all her ſkill in politics, with all the impudence of her pretenſions, to plan meaſures more likely to be ulti-

mately of ſervice to her and of detriment to Britain, than thoſe which have been already purſued; for after all, conſidering her miſerable behaviour in the field, conſidering the diſadvantage ſhe has ſuſtained in thoſe of her colonies by which ſhe ever got any thing, and in her maritime commerce, not entirely perhaps compenſated by the prodigious increaſe of her inland trade, or by the ſupplemental intervention of neutral bottoms. I ſay conſidering all theſe, ſhe could not well expect ſo fair a game as we have been collaterally playing into her hands, not only by the part we have taken againſt our ancient and natural ally, but in favour of her ancient and naturally ally. She could not well expect ſo great an advantage ſhould come to her, quite clear of all deductions. That would have been too good a bargain. She muſt have been unreaſonable with a vengeance, if ſhe could grudge us the joy of two or three neutral iſlands dropping to us, in the courſe of our naval ſuperiority, or even the reduction, on her coaſt, of a paultry inſignificant one, however affectedly dubbed with the appellation of "IMPORTANT," at the expence of ſo many lives and ſo much treaſure; when this is all we have to ſhew for the ſucceſs of one year (1761) for more than twenty millions ſterling expence: and even that ſucceſs reſting on a hollow foundation. Could ſhe be otherwiſe than pleaſed to ſee a people, her enemies, intoxicated with ſuch trifling and falſe advantages, while their attention was taken off from the incomparably greater object of her politics on the continent? What a joke muſt it have been to have figured to herſelf our prodigy of a great man, wrapped up in his own tremendous importance, out-bluſtering the leſs *clamorous* voice of ſound policy, and, to the unmeaning waſte of the national wealth and blood, planning expeditions as ſchoolboys make

nonſenſe-

nonſenſe-verſes, where nothing but the ſound is conſulted, the ſenſe being out of the queſtion.

In this light of compenſation France may very well laugh at our lopping a few of her branches, and ſome of them notoriouſly barren ones, while her root and ſtem have been demonſtrably all the while gathering but the more vigour for the operation.

Then why was Buſſy ſent, why did ſhe ſue for peace? I will firſt preſume to give my conjectures what it was he could not come for; and next upon what may have been the real views of that court in his miſſion; all which I humbly ſubmit to better judgment.

In the actual diſpoſition of things, France muſt have been as much her own enemy in fact, as we are in intention, if ſhe had entertained but ſo frantic a thought as that of wiſhing to break the miniſterial UNANIMITY in that continental career which we were ſo ſelf-deſtructively purſuing. No, her ſtale dividing arts ſhe would naturally reſerve for ſuch nations as were adhering to their own natural intereſt, in oppoſition to her's, which was far from the caſe with us. She could not but with infinite pleaſure ſee a boaſting practitioner adminiſtering, againſt our complaints, a medicine very juſtly reckoned a ſpecific, but joined with a mortal poiſon that would infallibly worſe than fruſtrate all its *ſucceſs*. In this condition of treatment, what had France to do but to put up prayers in all her churches for the continuance of our employing ſuch a practitioner; inſtead of her ſending over a man to procure his removal, or to diſunite either thoſe that admired his practice, or could meanly acquieſce in it?

Still a diſunion followed. It did ſo; after Buſſy came, and perhaps in conſequence of his coming, but not moſt certainly of any influence he had or

could wiſh to have to that effect. So much the worſe for France that that diſunion followed at all, and for us that it happened ſo late, as not improbably to be too late.

Now to anſwer this queſtion, why did Buſſy come? This is a queſtion eaſier to be anſwered than why he was at all admitted. There might be an hundred good reaſons to be given why the court of France ſhould wiſh to paſs upon other nations and even upon their own ſubjects the appearance of ſeeking a peace, or rather wiſh not to be accuſed of deſiring to continue the war; but there was not a ſingle good one for her being in earneſt or ſincere in ſeeking peace. Her deference perhaps, for ſome neutral nations whoſe amicable mediation ſhe might not chuſe too manifeſtly to ſlight; her deſign to impoſe on the Turks by a ſtep that might ſhow them the poſſibility of an union among the chriſtian powers, in order to counteract the influence of the Pruſſian machinations at the Port; a ſatisfaction the French court might think itſelf obliged to give to thoſe of its own ſubjects, who, loaded with taxes and hurt in their naval trade, might think the French king too ſtiff in his rejection of the propoſals of peace made on our part after the battle of Minden: theſe and many other cauſes might be alledged for France reſorting to this mean but not unexpedient artifice of propoſing a congreſs for peace, with nothing but the continuation of war at her heart.

And this was palpably plain from the moment that Buſſy * was known to be the perſon appointed;

* This little agent or what they call *chargé des affaires*, had before the laſt war with France groſsly inſulted the late king both at Hanover and in London. At Hanover, where to every repreſentation the king was making him, he had no other anſwer but,

ed; and that his coming was with the conſent and in concert with the queen of Hungary. Here, not to be tedious, I do not inſiſt on the impropriety of the choice of ſuch a little obnoxious creature, for a commiſſion of ſuch infinite importance that too much care could not have been taken, to ſend one of the greateſt authority and diſtinction to execute it in perſon. Let him have all the weight, all the authenticity, thoſe can deſire who juſtify the admiſſion of him at all, but let any perſon capable of thinking, reſolve to himſelf the following queſtion. Is it at all likely, (even granting the French court ſincere in its deſires of peace, which I am far from believing) that the queen of Hungary, circumſtanced as things were in the theatre, eſpecially of the Pruſſian war, was in the leaſt inclined to acquieſce in our continuing to aſſiſt Pruſſia? However intereſted France might be in ſaving that monarch from abſolute ruin, and conſequently diſpoſed towards a ſeparate accommodation which might ſecure that point, here our brilliant ſucceſſes are in the way of our dear ally. France but for them might perhaps have leſs regarded the oppoſition of Auſtria; but unproſperous as ſhe has been, ſhe ſees herſelf forced to keep meaſures with that power, and to play that ſaving game for herſelf, which we have put out of her power to play in favour of our ally, whoſe ſafety ſhe perhaps, at bottom, wiſhes more

but, "*Mais, Sire, Monſieur de Maillebois,*" as if he had been holding a rod over a child, that general being then hovering about that electorate with forty thouſand men. In London, when the king aſked him what news at Paris, all his anſwer was, "*Sire, il y géle.*" "*May it pleaſe your majeſty it freezes there.*" —— His excuſe for this was yet worſe than the original impertinence. He ſaid he was *abſent*, yes *abſent*, while ſpeaking to a king of England: this clerk of an office, this *commis pour les affaires etrangeres.*

than

than we need to do. Her ſending then Buſſy, circumſtanced as things are, may well be ſuſpected of a concerted captiouſneſs and artifice.

The courts of Vienna and Verſailles foreſaw, moſt probably beſpoke, our anſwer upon that capital point of our part in the continental war, ſuch as it has been given, and, perhaps, ſuch as there was a fatal pre-engagement for its being given, with which they were not unacquainted. They would have been, moſt likely, very, very ſorry it ſhould have been other than what it was. In which caſe their ſcheme, their only ſcheme, in making an inſidious parade of it over all Europe would have been baulked.

In the mean time, it cannot be but ſomewhat grating to Britons, and I would add ſurprizing, but that nothing now can well be ſurprizing, that the printing preſs of the Louvre at Paris ſhould, in the publication from it of the account of this celebrated negociation, get the ſtart of the authoritative one at London, inſomuch that a people of arrant ſlaves ſhould be firſt ſerved, and receive an earlier ſatisfaction than a nation of free born ſubjects; to whom it was ſo much more due, if but for their unbounded confidence proved by their unbounded ſupplies. Was it fit, was it decent, that it ſhould be to the French government and not to our own, that the Britiſh public ſhould be indebted for the communication of a tranſaction which ſo deeply intereſts us? To ſay nothing of the propriety there would have been in not ſuffering France to prepoſſeſs all Europe againſt us, before the counterpoiſon ſhould in our repreſentation of things be ready to oppoſe to it. Who does not know the force of firſt impreſſions?

As to the famous memorial, in which Buſſy, at the very juncture that we have a Spaniſh miniſter here,

here, inveſted with the requiſite authority of a public character from his own court, pragmatically, and againſt all the courſe and forms of buſineſs, interpoſed demands, ſo foreign from the purpoſe in the behalf of the Spaniſh nation, nothing can be plainer than by that prepared interlude, that he was ſent rather to inſult and ſolemnly banter our court, than with any real deſign of treating for a peace. That memorial then ſeems purely to have been proviſionally calculated for an obſtacle to concluſion; in caſe our continental engagements had not of themſelves been a ſufficient one, and rendered the inſiſtence on the other needleſs. Buſſy was perhaps too haſty in the preſentation of that memorial, prepared, as it ſhould ſeem, to elude a concluſion, in caſe he ſhould, againſt expectation, have found too great a forwardneſs to renounce an ally, who, on a like occaſion, would ſcarce have been over-ſcrupulouſly tender of renouncing us.

However, if France was really ſincere in that negotiation, which is ſurely not the moſt probable ſuppoſition; hard indeed is the fate of Britain to be ſo fettered with an ally ſo inſignificant, ſo detrimental to her, and to whom all our high heroics of declaring we will ſupport him with "*efficacy* and GOOD FAITH," can do him ſo little ſervice, while they load us with an intolerable burthen of endleſs expence of all kinds, and what is worſe, yet with the general odium. On the other hand, if in thoſe overtures of hers, ſhe laid a ſnare for the anſwer ſhe beſpoke and wiſhed from us, it cannot be ſaid that Buſſy has not fulfilled the capital object of his miſſion.

And if ſubordinately he was employed in creating any breach, it was not moſt certainly among our miniſters; but between nations, between thoſe of

of Britain and Spain: and it is yet far from clear that this point is not gained. And here I intreat every ſenſible Briton to conſider, whether an open rupture between this court and Spain, is not the very game that France has been, with all her arts, ſtriving for the whole war; and if ſo, whether thoſe are the enemies of their country who would wiſh, if poſſible, to parry that French blow, or thoſe who want raſhly to precipitate us into a Spaniſh war, while our continental one exiſts, of which the whole weight may perhaps fall upon us but too ſoon.

There are many, no doubt, who can well remember the laſt Spaniſh war. The people, with their uſual ductility, when ſpecious reaſons are given them, had been worked up into a pitch of frenzy and outrageous clamour for a war with Spain. Nothing was dreamed of but captured galleons, Vigo expeditions, and plundering, if not conquering, the mines of Mexico, Peru, Potoſi, &c. And yet, for all the ſucceſſes a few privateers met with, which certainly did not much enrich the nation; for all our *ſucceſſes*, for ſucceſſes we had, the moment that our continental connections began to make us feel their oppreſſive weight, all our efforts were baulked. A great aſſembly no longer reſounded with the emphatic terms of "*No ſearch, my lords, no ſearch*:" and that capital and primary object of the war became a ſacrifice, by patriots too! to the ſituation of things on the *continent*; ſo that not a word was ſaid of it at the famous *boſtage-peace* of Aix la Chapelle, and we came to an accommodation with Spain, after having received ſuch diminution and damages in our trade with that nation, as are not to this day repaired, and are perhaps irreparable.

But

But granted, that a war with Spain, conſidered only as a war with Spain, or with France together, is no ſuch formidable matter; granted that we ought even, in good policy, if our hands were not too full already, to be before-hand with the Spaniards; ſince, to make all fair conceſſions, their cloſe concert and connections with the court of France, are undoubted truths: granted that their marine is in as weak a condition as it is repreſented: What does that infer? So much the leſs ought the great ſtateſman to be heard with patience in his propoſals of a war, which after all may be inevitable. From him nothing can come with a worſe grace. Had we not been embarraſſed with the continent, there was nothing, perhaps, we ought more to have wiſhed, braved, and even provoked, than a war with Spain, upon as much aſſurance as we have of its unfriendly ſentiments towards us. At the commencement of this war, we were undoubtedly, in our own proper channel of a naval war, a match for both France and Spain: I go farther; perhaps for a year or two with all Europe. But what then? Such a ſituation muſt be too violent to laſt. We could not well lay our account with warring down all Europe in any reaſonable time, or without ſome danger of our own deſtruction. And in the mean time, could a trading nation be ſuppoſed to maintain or ſupport its navy by no other trade, but what it ſhould carry on at the muzzle of its guns, or by maritime depredations? With regard to this laſt article, vain, vain indeed are moſt likely to be the hopes, of ſo many of thoſe who are now ſo gaunt and ſo eager for a Spaniſh war: nothing is more probable that, after ſo long a preparation, their ſchemes or arts for eluding our naval ſuperiority, will be at, leaſt equal, to what they were the laſt war; when there was very little

material done in that way. One naval commander's ſucceſs enriched and made him a lord; but the nation itſelf was no great gainer by it, on liquidating the expences of the armament. A few privateers picked up a few ſtraggling ſhips; but that object was nothing comparable to the damage done to our permanent trade; to ſay nothing of the ſucceſs of their privateers, which was not however inconſiderable.

But if a war with that nation is ſo deſirable a point, nothing, from the preſent aſpect of things, can be preſumed more likely to come into exiſtence: and if war is ſuch a bleſſing, I fancy, we ſhall have our fill of it, before we have done with it. The enemies to peace need not fear their wiſhes for the continuance of a war being baulked. They will doubtleſs hear with pleaſure, that in compariſon with what is to be expected, the war ſeems hardly yet begun. May we not be but too ſoon in a condition of not being able either to make peace or war!

In the mean while, it is hardly to be imagined, that the good people of Britain will not at length grow ſick of ſuch groſs impoſtures as, on the encouragement of what they have already ſwallowed, are continually attempted to be paſſed on them. But ſurely credulity has its bounds, if falſity and effrontery have none.

The people can never I hope in earneſt believe that the reaſon alledged for a late reſignation was other than a pretext, and a pretext eaſily ſeen through: while not all the annals of the hiſtory of this or any nation, can produce ſuch ſtrange circumſtances as thoſe which followed this ſtep.

An

An anonimous incendiary letter is ſent to ſome citizen in the clouds: the ſacred ſecrets of the privy-council, upon a point "*of the higheſt importance to* "*the crown, and to the moſt eſſential national intereſts,*" are with the utmoſt indignity revealed by a privy-counſellor; the name of one of the privy-counſellors is very frankly and without ceremony inſerted at full length, while that of the writer himſelf, is as improperly as it is unneceſſarily ſuppreſſed; ſince the contents implicitly make it impoſſible to miſtake it. And what contents! what a ſtile! what an aſſurance! Would any really great miniſter, do you think, have ever mentioned it as matter of complaint, or in the way of diſculpation, that he was not ſuffered to "GUIDE" his ſovereign and her council? Could a PERPETUAL DICTATOR have employed a more impudent expreſſion? In ſhort, is there a grain of common ſenſe, and eſpecially of modeſty, in the whole letter, except indeed in its being publiſhed without the name being ſigned to it.

To carry on this miſerable farce, a nameleſs citizen takes upon him, without any apparent authority, to anſwer it in the name of the city; and in this anſwer, while the memory of the city is extolled, it is a pity that ſo little is ſaid in favour of their judgment. And even perhaps their memory would not have done them an ill office, if while it was ſuggeſting to them the treacherouſly flattering ſide of things, it had not ſuffered them to forget all that infinitely outweighed what they are ſo good as to remember. It might not have been either unwiſe or unreaſonable to reflect, that at the very moment of this well-timed reſignation, our armies and navies had been victorious in vain; that our *ſucceſſes* had ſo little of ſubſtance in them, that they had

only made our nation leſs beloved, without being more feared, more eſteemed, or even the more ſtrengthened; that the ſo loudly ſounded gains by trade were ſcarce a farthing in the pound, to the actual expences, and to thoſe which our fatal politics threaten to intail upon us; that the French ſuit to us for peace was probably rather an inſulting banter than a proof of their being reduced; the French having at this very inſtant a far more hopeful game to play than our ſo glorioufly "GUIDED" politics have left to us; that the continental abiſs of Britiſh treaſure and blood had been unmeaſurably widened by the very man, who might never have emerged out of his obſcurity, but for his outrageous declamation againſt it; that it was in the face of a moſt honorable aſſembly declared by him, that not half a man was to go to Germany, whereas above twenty five thouſand whole men have been ſince ſent, of whom indeed it is well if the half ever come back again.

At the ſame time, I ſincerely agree with the letter-writer, not indeed in calling people fools, and knaves, but in allowing ſuch to be miſtaken, as call the great man's reſignation a *deſertion* of the public. No. It was not when he went out of his office that he *deſerted* the public, but preciſely when he went into his office. *Then*, *then*, was the fatal epoch of his deſertion: and it is on that epoch the people ſhould fix their eyes; and not on his late gentle ſet-down, on a downy annuity, not to mention the feather in his lady's cap.

And now, to go farther yet, in his favour than even that affectionate friend of his, the anſwerer of his moſt curious epiſtle: ſince things are ſo very floriſhing, and ſince Britain is ſaid to have reaped ſuch immenſe advantages by his adminiſtration, my ſincere

cere wiſh is, that fifty thouſand pounds a year ſhould be ſettled upon him, to be duly and regularly paid him and his heirs for ever, out of ſuch emoluments or neat profit as ſhall accrue, or by any fair argument from his continuance in power, be proved poſſible to accrue to this nation from his prodigious ſervices. And yet I am afraid that if he was never to touch any thing but what ſhould come to him from the produce of that fund, he would be one of the pooreſt private gentlemen in the kingdom; he might then indeed be driven by dint of real diſtreſs to part with his coach-horſes; and the advertiſement for their ſale, would not need to put even his captivated admirers to the bluſh; his admirers whom, if they had been ſo many new negroes, he could not have more groſly inſulted, than in that opinion of their underſtandings which that advertiſement implies, in his ſuppoſing that it could make any other impreſſion on them than that of the moſt thorough diſdain of ſo mean and paultry an artifice.

Well! but the city returned him their lamentable thanks in form. They did ſo. Peace be to the city! They have their reaſons, and conſtitute, without doubt, one of the moſt reſpectable public bodies in the kingdom. They might be willing to keep up the ſhuttlecock. Inwardly perhaps conſcious of having paid worſhip to the unknown man, to as little purpoſe as the Athenians did to the unknown God, they might be ſorry to think they had thrown away any thing ſo precious as their eſteem and gold boxes, when boxes of another metal would be of more ſervice to keep up the virtue of what is ſo likely to be much wanted for him, an unembarraſſed countenance. In ſhort they are men, and do not, I preſume, pretend to infallibility. And few indeed are thoſe great minds who make even a merit

merit of confeſſing an error. Few conſider that if truth has a wreath for thoſe who have originally defended her, ſhe has a much more glorious one in reſerve for thoſe who yield to her, after having combated her: and reaſon good: that yielding implies the moſt honorable as it is the hardeſt of all conqueſts, the conqueſt over one's ſelf.

As for the anſwer to the reſolution of thanks; it is as pretty a piece of cold poetical proſe as a man would wiſh to read on a ſummer's day. What a turgid vein of important banter! But eſpecially how moving, wherewith a moſt pindaric tranſition from the citizens to the military, that moſt gracious prince the orator is pleaſed to deck his *victims* for ſacrifice, at leaſt, with flowers of rhetoric! It is really a pity that that fine theatrical panegiric of "the matchleſs intrepidity of the Britiſh ſailors and "ſoldiers, conducted by officers juſtly famed "through all the quarters of the world" ſhould not be read at the head of the Britiſh troops now periſhing with ſuch amazing "propriety" in the dreary fields of Germany. It would be an admirable cordial to them, almoſt equal to the thanks of their German general. But, at this rate, the navy and army cannot fail of being *taken* in, as well as the good city. Well done, Mr. Bayes, "pit, box, and gallery it, egad!"

I hope however we ſhall never more hear the names of Demoſthenes and Tully proſtituted and burleſqued by a nauſeous miſ-application. What is extant of their writings proves, I think, pretty clearly, that at leaſt, they could write their own language. Whereas, only figure to yourſelf a modern orator, in the midſt of a public aſſembly, fixing a haggard look, on one whom he ſuſpected to have written againſt him, and ſtaring at him with an air

air that ſeemed archly to ſay, " *I am at you, ſir*" and then by way of an overwhelming reproach, bringing out, " *I never wrote a pamphlet.*" When the whole honourable aſſembly might, on their own knowledge, have anſwered him with one voice, " *Sir, you could not.*" No, nor half a page of common Engliſh, even in buſineſs which generally almoſt writes itſelf. *Res verba ſequuntur.* But not with modern orators. Witneſs certain occaſional ſpecimens of writing, ſuch for example as " thoſe " ever memorable *ſecret* inſtructions in the pure " hurlothrumbo ſtrain, ſo decently and no doubt " ſo *warrantably* publiſhed with his *majeſty*'s title " *gutted* of its *vowels*, prefixed to them." Witneſs various letters and anſwers, in the ſtile of his declamatory jargon, effectedly pathetic, and ſonorouſly empty. Perhaps I exagerate. Only examine them yourſelf, and deny it if you can.

But now, to reſume more important conſiderations. I have before hinted that the reaſon alledged for a late reſignation was rather a pretext than a motive.

That a motive it could not be, the plain ſtate of things muſt inconteſtably demonſtrate. The Spaniards were it ſeems ſuſpected, and I really believe very juſtly, of hoſtile intentions towards us; nay, if we believe that famous anonimous letter, they had actually done enough to draw upon them our immediate reſentment. I will not even deny that. But once more, what then? ſo much the worſe for whoever could be juſtly accuſed of his meaſures being the cauſe why the privy counſellors were againſt a precipitate declaration of war. They might have many reaſons for fighting Spain at her own weapon of temporizing, and for winking hard at her known partiality to France. They might not

not chuſe to imitate the example ſet them by the Pruſſian hero, of too raſh an aggreſſion, or of but the appearance of an aggreſſion. Spain as only connected with France they might hold as cheap as the great projector of expeditions himſelf may himſelf effect to do: there might even more be got than loſt by a war with her, if the war reſted ſingly on the Britiſh bottom. But as things ſtand on the continent (and whoſe fault is it that they ſtand ſo?) might not it be rather raſh, prematurely to plunge headlong into another war: or is there that ſtep in the world to be taken that could give France more joy? Then indeed Buſſy might not be ſaid to have come over in vain. But, with ſuch an overload of debt as has been incurred ſince the commencement of this "*arduous*" war; and if not with ſome diminution of the live-force of this country, at leaſt with the already ſuch multiplied calls for its diſperſion as can hardly be afforded out of the numbers of our population; are the members of the privy council to be inſulted, or to have the mob raiſed upon them for pauſing, for ſcrupling to embark the nation farther in a war to which already they ſee no end? But with what inexpreſſible ſcorn and indignation muſt the propoſal be heard by them from the very man whoſe ſtriking ſo deep into thoſe continental meaſures he had ſo often deteſted or eſpouſed, juſt as he happened to be in or out of place, might be ſo juſtifiably a cauſe of their demur? Might they not have unanimouſly ſaid to him, with infinite truth and propriety? "Your-
"ſelf, ſir, yourſelf are the cauſe; nor do we chuſe
"to be the engines GUIDED by you to puſh the na-
"tion down that precipice to the brink of which you
"have brought her." In ſhort, is there any man's mouth out of which the orator could be more juſtly condemned than out of his own?

It

It is not then credible that his reſignation could be the effect of a diſſent of which his own departure from that great political principle, the poſſeſſion of which had made his fortune, was notoriouſly the cauſe. Nor is it but obſervable, that in that anonymous letter the word *ficklenеſs*, with regard to people's "withdrawing their good opinion from "one who has ſerved his country with *fidelity* and "*ſucceſs*," is ſtudiouſly and very wiſely avoided. It would have been hard indeed for the mob itſelf to go beyond him in fickleneſs: neither could any be ſaid to leave him, but he them. As to *fidelity*, I hope he does not mean to his declarations: and as to *ſucceſs*, it remains I fancy to be proved, whether it ultimately deſerves that name or not; unleſs he means his own obtainment of an annuity and title in his family.

And now as to the real, not the pretended motive of this reſignation, there is a conjecture, offered only as a conjecture, the degree of probability of which is entirely ſubmitted to your own knowledge of things. Judge and pronounce.

Weigh then with yourſelf the aſpect and ſituation of things upon the continent, at the time this reſignation took place. Conſider whether the events expected in Germany were likely to be of a favourable nature. A miſchance there might not improbably turn the tide of popularity againſt the perſon accuſable at leaſt of our ſhare, having been ſo deep as it is in that theatre of all the horrors of a civil war, in which we had originally ſo little to do. Nay Hanover itſelf had been offered a neutrality, before the convention was ſo unfortunately broke. That which arguments, which repreſentations had not been able to do, there was ſome reaſon to think

that on any untoward accident on the continent, actual feelings would effect; that is to ſay, open the eyes of an honeſt and deceived people: a people whoſe virtues had been originally, through a credulity which was afterwards rivetted by gratitude for bottomleſs ſucceſſes, made ſubſervient to their own deſtruction, and whoſe indignation could not but be expected the more ardent, whenever it ſhould break out, for their finding what a cruel advantage had been taken againſt themſelves, of their confidence and goodneſs. He might not think it quite impoſſible that they ſhould make him the ſcape-goat of thoſe continental meaſures, which himſelf has confeſſed that he "GUIDED," after notoriouſly pointing them out as the path of perdition.

In the natural dread then of ſuch an event, there offered but one way for him to eſcape the burſt of the ſtorm; and that was trying how much more impoſition the people would bear. That propoſal of ruſhing headlong into a Spaniſh war carried with it, eſpecially to thoſe who lull themſelves with the viſionary dreams of rolling in Spaniſh gold and ſilver from ſurpriſed fleets, or captured galleons, a popular air of ſpirit and reſolution. No matter with what impropriety this motion ſhould come, eſpecially from the perſon whence it did come. The tub thrown out to the multitude might at leaſt divert their attention from the capital object on the continent, while himſelf ſhould eſcape in all the confuſion he will have created. Nor is he wholly miſtaken. There are doubtleſs too many of the well-meaning ſo very prejudice-ridden, that to his leaving his office, thoſe very events will be by them imputed of which his own meaſures will be the cauſe, and his own foreſeeing that they are, humanly ſpeaking, not to be prevented, is his ſole motive

for

for leaving his office. And yet what numbers have extolled to the ſkies thoſe meaſures, who have already felt, or will moſt probably in future feel the ſevere conſequences of them, in their property, as well as perhaps in the blood of their deareſt relations!

In ſhort, what is there ſo groſs as will not paſs upon an infatuated people? It is on that he depends, and I ſhould be very loth to be too ſure that he will not meet with his uſual *ſucceſs*. At leaſt, I ſhould not be at all ſurpriſed to ſee him triumphantly riding the blaſt, and once more mobbed into power; again perched upon the pinnacle, and crowing over king and country. The improbability of ſuch an event, and its tendency to ſeal the utter perdition of this nation, already in no ſmall jeopardy, are but reaſons the more for believing that this event will take place. In ſhort, there is nothing ſo contradictory that humor and prejudice will not themſelves ſwallow, or attempt to cram down the throats of others. They will, for proofs of a man's ſteadineſs, produce inſtances of his having three or four times renounced his principles, and of the purity of his diſintereſtedneſs, his acceptance of an annuity and a title.

For theſe laſt however, if he is but half as grateful to the people for their real benefits, as they are to him for his imaginary ones, he owes them a moſt oratorial addreſs of thanks; ſince the court's apprehenſion of their opinion of him, however unaccountably got, and more unaccountably kept after repeated forfeiture, had doubtleſs no ſmall ſhare in the rewards beſtowed on his moſt invaluable ſervices.

It may however on this occaſion not be improper to recommend to the conſideration of thoſe happy enough to poſſeſs their liberty of judgment, untyrannized over by popular prejudice, by particular humor, or by falſe intereſt, whether it would not be rather too impolitic for us, in favor of the king of Pruſſia, whom we might encourage to his ruin but never ſerve, to ſhut up all door of reconcilation with thoſe our ancient and natural allies, who have been alienated from us by our eſpouſal of his cauſe.

Now, would any of them, and eſpecially the court of Vienna, in any occurrence of renewing or treating with us ſeparately from France, the only way of treating with us we ought to wiſh, upon ſuch a point, for example ſo infinitely intereſting to us, as the guarding the Auſtrian Netherlands againſt the French invaſion, or their more dangerous inſinuation, chuſe to have any thing to ſay to a court "GUIDED" by the very man, who drew our ties ſo cloſe with its capital enemy? would it chuſe to concert meaſures with the man whoſe tranſitions from one point of politics to another diametrically oppoſite were ſo rapid, ſo ill-timed, ſo indecent, as to have rather the air of folly than of fickleneſs or even of ſelf-intereſt? Beſides, that in the tranſaction of buſineſs of ſtate, the figurative ſtile of tropes, metaphors, and ſimilies, goes for very little. The ſpirit of affairs is very different from the ſilly ſpirit of arrogance and ſelf-ſufficiency. Surely the ſtupidity of worſhipping ſuch an one, for a cackle that, inſtead of preſerving the capitol from the enemy, bids much fairer to let him in, is not even exceeded by that of the poor Oſtiacs of Siberia, worſhipping a brazen gooſe.

In the mean while it ſhould not paſs quite unremarked, that among the cauſes which have unhappily

pily contributed to keep up that frantic humor of extolling our great guide for thoſe enterprizes that could only perpetuate our double war and feed perdition, while the eyes of the people were by the falſe glare of them, taken off from incomparably the ſuperior object on the continent, by which all muſt be decided; there may be reckoned a dirty, little, partial vein of lucre, of which war in the pecuniary operations it creates, keeps the ſprings open to a ſet of people who fatten and thrive amazingly upon the public diſtreſſes and dangers.

Theſe are, I will not ſay thoſe of the moneyed in contradiſtinction to the landed hintereſt, becauſe, I fancy, they may be demonſtrated to be at bottom nearly the ſame; but only thoſe vultures and extortioners upon the public, who turn their money and their credit in the jobs of the alley, and carry on practices ſo eſſentially different from thoſe of the fair merchant, who employs and animates the induſtry of his countrymen. No: theſe are ſuch as prey on the vitals of their own country, and accumulate riches diſproportioned to the time and pains naturally requiſite in the due courſe of things, and accumulate them in a way reprobated by all wiſe governments. Theſe ſucceed not by honeſt arts, or juſt dealings, but by low cunning and little vile tricking. It is in ſhort of theſe that the landed intereſt have ſuch room to complain, ſince the ſecurity which is afforded by their viſible real eſtates, is made the very bottom upon which theſe people found their gaming. And a moſt infamous game it is: ſince they ſo palpably and wantonly ſport away the welfare and reputation of this country, that any little puff of news, any idle tale, any lie accidental or originally of their own invention, is ſufficient to give, at their diſcretion, to ſo capital a concern of the ſtate, as the ſtocks undoubtedly

are,

are, a fluctuation, which muſt very reaſonably give ill impreſſions of the ſolidity of the ſtocks to all thinking perſons, when they obſerve them capable of being ſunk or raiſed by means ſo deſpicable, and ſo much beneath their intrinſic importance. Such as theſe may well join the cry in favor of all that impolicy and unthrift which ſubject the nation to the neceſſity of negociating to their advantage thoſe immenſe ſums, which are the matter of their gaming: while for the payment of ſuch debts (how much in vain incurred!) the landed intereſt, and the induſtry of the artiſt, are not only actually fainting under the burthen, but ſee no proſpect of relief, but rather of its augmentation, till the whole ſtate ſhall ſink under it. It is ſuch as theſe, or their agents and puffers, that *value* the nation upon its facility of funding and borrowing, in which ſtile we may then with propriety be ſaid to be WORTH conſiderably above a hundred millions of debt. But while that facility of borrowing is ſo much admired, it were to be wiſhed that the neceſſity or purpoſes of borrowing had been alittle more ſtrictly examined than they appear to have been.

But ſurely thoſe who have not reſolutely ſet their own reaſon at defiance, will hardly, upon exerciſing their own faculty of thinking, in ſcorn of ſuffering others to think for them, who have long made a trade and practice of deceiving them, not ſee how cruelly, how groſsly this nation has been "*guided*," not only to its own deſtruction, but to that of thoſe to whom ſhe wiſhed well.

Many nations have madly ruined themſelves to ruin their enemies; but it was reſerved for the bedlam-born politics of our illuſtrious "*guide*" to exhibit the ſad ſight of a nation palpably ruining herſelf to no better purpoſe than to ruin her friends and allies, and to give her enemies advantages, that muſt

muſt ultimately far, far, over-compenſate the loſſes they might juſt, at the firſt flaſh, ſuſtain by her; loſſes more than inſignificant to the ſum of things, ſince they are rather the prediſpoſing cauſes of ultimately ſuperior gain to thoſe very enemies, we have ſo vainly imagined were to be reduced to the neceſſity of mumping a peace of us upon their knees, and upon any terms.

Nor are ſuch events in the claſs of thoſe that, to the "*guides*" chargeable with them, afford a juſtification in the difficulty of foreſeeing them. Could the madneſs of our continental connections have eſcaped thoſe who had not enough conſidered that point; with what face can the not ſeeing that madneſs be pleaded by the very man who had piqued himſelf upon his clear-ſightedneſs and penetration for diſcovering all that pregnancy with deſtruction in them, which was in truth of itſelf ſo obvious? But preciſely when he veered about, the reaſons for his perſeverance, if a regard for the public had been any thing elſe but a mere pretext with him, were a thouſand times more ſtrong than what they had been at the commencement of his clamor and oppoſition. The Pruſſian cauſe, which had before happily hung ſo looſe that it was not impoſſible to have ſhaken it off, was now double-rivetted, and for its impolicy, I will not ſay its injuſtice, could, in the nature of things, only make ours a bad one; but could never itſelf by ours be made a good one, taking the word, "good," but in the ſenſe of ſucceſsful. By this fatal adoption our war was totally tranſubſtantiated, totally changed its own juſt, noble, fair, and defenſible nature. We made ourſelves the guarantees of a cauſe we had never ſufficiently examined, and which, in truth, we had no right to examine

mine or judge either, and which we had actually begun by condemning, and by arming the Ruſſians againſt it. Thus was a falſe, adulterative, crazy bottom ſubſtituted to the true baſis of our national politics. And upon ſo wrong a bottom, is it ſuch a wonder that every thing ſhould in courſe be wrong even to our very *ſucceſſes?* Succeſſes which we have too lightly taken for evinced to be real ones, while in that adſcititious bottom, they ſelf-evidently carry a principle of perdition, unleſs all Europe ſhould be the inferior object, and our conqueſts the ſuperior one, which might ſo well have had their great, their ſolid value, on any other footing than what they now totter upon.

May they all be found retainable! for ſurely every unretainable conqueſt, conſidering the expence of blood and treaſure in the atchieving it, and the diſhonor and pain of parting with it, is rather in the conſequence, a wound received than a wound given; a barbed arrow, not to be extracted without anguiſh, ſhame, and periſhment of ſubſtance.

But ſhould the nation find herſelf at laſt indiſpenſably compelled by the united voice of Europe, and by the neceſſity of circumſtances, to give up points that ſhe would diſdain to give up, but for ſuperior conſiderations of her good and perhaps even of her ſafety, what will be the conſequence? An obvious one. The cry of puſillanimity, of cowardice, poſſibly even of treachery, will be raiſed by the very man and the deluded admirers of that man, whoſe levity, whoſe deſertion of his own political principle, that is to ſay, if he had any, will have given to thoſe ſucceſſes, as falſely attributed to him, as they are impudently arrogated by him,

that

that collateral rotten cauſe of their being worſe than only good for nothing; unleſs perhaps to perpetuate a war that muſt conſume all profit to be expected from the *immenſe revenue* of our conqueſts, and to diſtreſs a government that will juſtly apprehend giving even the ſhadow of offence to the people. A people whoſe ſenſibility of honor, and bravery, renders them reſpectable; but who are at the ſame time but too liable, from their own ſcorn and diſdain of all impoſition, not enough to ſuppoſe thoſe who are exceptions among them being capable of it. To theſe they have been ſo miſguided as to give their confidence, and to continue it after the forfeiture of it, to ſuch a point that, not improbably to a man's going out of a poſt, they will impute ſuch unfavourable incidents as would never have exiſted, but for his having come into it: while thoſe favourable ones, of which the honor has been given to him, might moſt probably have taken place without the folly or guilt of giving them a collateral connection that would ſo much worſe than fruſtrate them.

However, even to thoſe under the moſt ſanguine prepoſſeſſion in favor of the late guidance of things, ſome queſtions may be ſtated, for *their own* reſolving, upon *their own* reflexion and knowledge, that can hardly not lead them to a right ſenſe of things, that is to ſay, if they are not pre-determined againſt being ſincere with themſelves, which, by the bye, is not a very uncommon, though always a ſhameful caſe.

Let any one then reflect, the ſtate of things conſidered, whether, had we, at the beginning of the war with France, ſingly ventured to reſt the iſſue on the exertion of the national force, in the naval

channel; there has appeared any ſuch ſuperiority of ſtrength in her, allowing even that ſhe had not ſent a ſingle man to oppoſe that miſerable diverſion we have made in Germany, as needed to make us deſpair of heartily ſickening her of the war; ay, even if Spain had been joined to her. Had our *conqueſts* too in ſuch caſe been fewer and leſs brilliant, can there be a doubt of their being more ſolid?

Whoſe fault then was it that the war was not carried on upon that naval plan? who was it that "*guided*" us ſo much *farther* than before, into a land war, upon ſuch terms of a diſhonorable ſubordination, and eſpecially of impolicy, as no records of hiſtory can ſhew any thing approaching to it? Is it for that man then or his adherents to dare to reproach his honeſt, his innocent countrymen with thoſe diſtreſſes and difficulties into which his own deſertion of his own tenets, and his hanging the Britiſh cauſe on a rotten thread will have brought them? At leaſt ſuch a man can hardly have more eloquence, and certainly not more effrontery than will be neceſſary even to the but defending himſelf; ſo far from being ſo much as ſuffered to take the advantage of attacking others upon that cruel dilemma which himſelf will have created.

But eſpecially will thoſe who juſtify the Pruſſian alliance on the ſtrange principles, of its ſtrengthening us by decreaſing our friends, and multiplying our enemies, and upon the falſe ſuppoſition too that we were ſingly inferior to France, at the commencement of the war, before our debt was ſo enormouſly augmented, before that ſo many of our brave defenders were ſent to ſo little purpoſe to the butchery on the fields of Germany, or to periſh yet more cruelly by the diſtemperature of a foreign climate;

climate; will theſe, I ſay, contend for our being now in a condition to war down all Europe? Or by what way of reaſoning, unleſs ſuch frantic reaſoning were dated from Bedlam, can it be averred that we were *then* inferior to France, and are *now* ſo incomparably ſuperior to her, as to be ready for undertaking to make head againſt all Europe, if neceſſary; enabled as we are, by that prodigious revenue received, or likely ſoon to be received from our mighty conqueſts, the "*important*" Belleiſle, the "*opulent*" Guadaloupe, and th *fertile* Canada, as well as by the number of tru and loyal ſubjects we have made in them; not to mention the vaſt acceſſion to our ſide of thoſe neutral nations whom our politics have filled with "*amazement*" and "*veneration.*"

But, alas! inſtead of thoſe *ſucceſſes* having brought us any real augmentation of ſtrength, either actual or reputed, nothing is more likely than that they will furniſh one proof more of its being far from impoſſible for a nation to ſee its influence and credit diminiſhed, not only in ſpite of her ſucceſſes, but even, by her ſucceſſes, while not founded on her own natural, juſt, and honorable politics. Let us then diſdain all falſe gaſconade: all boaſtful inſiſtence on our hollow ſucceſſes, with that diſſimulation of our diſadvantages, incurred by the fault of falſe guides, which is ſo much to our own wrong, and to our farther miſguidance, eſpecially while it is not yet clear but that the damage done to us by our unnational meaſures and connections, is already irreparable. But if not irreparable, as I hope it will ever be as much beneath Britiſh magnanimity to conſider them, as it ought to be beneath Britiſh ſagacity not to ſee difficulties where they really exiſt, or to miſtake the authors of them;

the point then will be to wiſh, and devoutly to expect, the reparation there only from whence it can properly and conſtitutionally come; from a Britiſh king and a Britiſh parliament; from a patriot ſovereign, aſſiſted by a patriot ſenate, in contempt of all thoſe little dirty ſelfiſh cabals for power and influence, which have only ſerved to diſgrace the higheſt offices of the ſtate, by bringing into them the men on earth the moſt unfit for them, to the infinite damage and diſhonor of the nation. While at the ſame time, to a king of any ſenſe or ſpirit, it muſt give the moſt mean opinion of mankind, as well as make him bluſh for having ſuch ſubjects, on his ſeeing the moſt worthleſs among them impudently taking the lead, and others, without the excuſe of want, ſubmitting for ſome point of vile intereſt, and that intereſt a falſe one, to footman it to their inferiors, to ſell, in ſhort themſelves and their country, in a manner that made it hard to pronounce whether the ſtupidity or the infamy of the proſtitution was the greateſt. A want of ſpirit that muſt thin the nation of effective defenders, and fill a court with ſoft ideots or uneſſential triflers, without a grain of merit but that of a Cappadocian ſervility, that would turn the ſtomach of a man of any ſenſe or taſte but to think of it.

If then not to deſpair of ſeeing the great national council aid with the moſt faithful and loyal advice a Britiſh king, loved and deſerving to be loved for his meaning well to his ſubjects: if to wiſh, by their efficacious concurrence, to ſee things replaced on the good old honeſt Britiſh bottom: if, without the leaſt perſonal animoſity, and with ſentiments rather of pity than indignation, againſt even thoſe wretched *guides* who were the

the authors of thoſe breaches, to wiſh a ſolemn authoritative inquiry how that ſpirit came to predominate which has eſſentially violated the moſt important article of the *Act of Settlement*; what councils have tended to weaken and impoveriſh the kingdom by domeſtic corruption, and to what end that corruption; what practices have madly waſted the wealth, and blood of the nation, eſpecially in bringing another war upon her hands, as to which ſhe had nothing ſo well to do as to keep clear of it; how that capitulation at Cloſter-Seven ſo devoutly to have been wiſhed by Great Britain came to be broke, and why the neutrality offered to Hanover was rejected; and this retroſpect to be made without any malignity towards particular delinquents, but purely to apply the beſt remedies that cool determinate wiſdom may ſuggeſt, againſt the pernicious conſequences of paſt meaſures to the welfare of this country, and to prevent the like in future; if, in ſhort, to wiſh that that management of affairs, and that only, may take place, which ſhall be big with the greateſt good to this great, this worthy, this reſpectable, this generous, and much deceived nation, be a crime, it is at the leaſt the only crime intended in the foregoing reflections, of which may every word that is not dictated by the pureſt ſpirit of well-wiſhing to this country, be received and treated with all the ſcorn and indignation, not the leſs due to ſuch as inveighing againſt falſe pretences to candor and impartiality in others, muſt be incomparably the more guilty on their incurring that reproach themſelves, for this infamous practice being ſo ſtale and ſo trite an one!

I am, SIR,

Yours, &c.

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